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“The Power to Tax Involves the Power 
to Destroy”1 
HOW AVANT-GARDE ART OUTSTRIPS THE 
IMAGINATION OF REGULATORS, AND WHY A 
JUDICIAL RUBRIC CAN SAVE IT 
INTRODUCTION 
Had they been there, Dan Flavin and Bill Viola might 
have felt as naked as the fabled emperor when the customs 
officials in London declared their artwork, carefully packed in 
crates for international shipping, was just not art. Not art? 
No⎯only light fixtures and DVD players. Dan Flavin, hailed as 
the “conjurer of light and lyrical poet of Minimal Art,”2 and 
considered part of the inner core of Minimalism, passed away in 
1996 after decades of making neutral, geometric works with 
fluorescent light tubes.3 Seminal video artist Bill Viola today 
continues to make haunting, existential video works exploring a 
central theme⎯birth and death.4 In 2006, United Kingdom 
customs (Her Majesty’s Revenues & Customs or H.M. Revenues 
& Customs) handed the London art gallery, Haunch of Venison, 
a £36,000 bill5 when the gallery imported these two works from 
the United States; Customs reasoned that the works, when 
disassembled, fail to qualify for the discounted import tax 
normally given to “works of art.”6 So disassembled, the works 
amount to little more than electronic parts—light bulbs, 
various lighting fixtures, projectors, and their accoutrement. 
  
 1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).  
 2 Manfred Schneckenburger, Sculpture, in ART OF THE 20TH CENTURY, VOL. 
II, at 528 (Germany, 1998). 
 3 The Collection: Dan Flavin, MOMA.ORG, http://www.moma.org/collection/ 
artist.php?artist_id=1911 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). 
 4 Christiane Fricke, New Media, in ART OF THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 2, 
at 615. 
 5 Georgina Adam, Flavin and Viola Light Works Ruled “Not Art,” ART 
NEWSPAPER (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Flavin-and-Viola-
light-works-ruled-not-art/22069. 
 6 Pierre Valentin & Daniel McClean, Haunch of Venison VAT Victory, ART 
NEWSPAPER (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Haunch-of-Venison-
VAT-victory/16944. 
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Under U.K. law, if classified as sculpture (a subcategory of the 
general category of works of art), the works would only be 
subject to an import value-added tax (VAT) of 5 percent and 
would be completely exempt from customs duty.7 When U.K. 
Customs declared that the parts of these artworks did not 
qualify as artworks, or more specifically sculptures, the 
importers were subjected to the standard import VAT rate8 (17.5 
percent at the time,9 and 20 percent as of January 1, 201110).  
In 2008, the gallery brought a lawsuit in the London 
VAT and Customs Tribunal (Tribunal) challenging the customs 
bill.11 At this proceeding, favorable U.K. and European Union 
precedent, statements from U.S. tax officials, and testimony 
from gallerists and critics convinced the court that the works 
should be classified as sculptures, bringing them within the 
VAT reduction and duty exemption.12 The Tribunal held that it 
would be “absurd” to classify the components of the works as 
something different from what they would be—works of art—
when they were fully assembled.13 But, in a 2010 reversal that 
shocked the art world, the European Commission (Commission) 
issued a regulation that reversed the 2008 decision of the 
Tribunal and reaffirmed the original customs determination.14 
According to the Commission, the light and video works of 
Flavin and Viola were no more than the sum of their non-art 
  
 7 Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Not Art?, OTHER BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010, 6:53 PM), 
http://blog.othercommunications.com/?p=788; Valentin & McClean, supra note 6. 
 8 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6. 
 9 Pierre Valentin, United Kingdom: The European Commission Says It’s Not 
Art, MONDAQ (June 20, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/x/135086/Music+and+the+Arts/ 
The+European+Commission+Says+Its+Not+Art [hereinafter Valentin, Not Art]. 
 10 Europe Rules that Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Artworks Are Not Art, ARTINFO 
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/36594/europe-rules-that-dan-flavin-
and-bill-viola-artworks-are-not-art/; see also Maev Kennedy, Call that Art? No, Dan 
Flavin’s Work Is Just Simple Light Fittings, Say EU Experts, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2010, 
3:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/dec/20/art-dan-flavin-light-eu. 
 11 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] 
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal 
(London)). 
 12 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6. 
 13 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820, at [49]; see also 
Valentin & McClean, supra note 6. 
 14 Commission Regulation 731/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 214) (EC). See infra Part II; see 
also Adam, supra note 5; Dan Flavin Work Classified by EU as Light Fittings, ARTLYST 
(Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.artlyst.com/articles/dan-flavin-work-classified-by-eu-as-light-
fittings; Europe Rules that Dan Flavin and Bill Viola Artworks Are Not Art, supra note 
10; Kennedy, supra note 10; Murray Wardrop, VAT on Modern Art as EU Says Works are 
“Light Fittings,” TELEGRAPH (Dec. 21, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
culture/art/art-news/8216017/VAT-on-modern-art-as-EU-says-works-are-light-
fittings.html. 
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parts.15 Not only was this regulation⎯passed “behind closed 
doors . . . . [and] contrary to the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice”⎯highly suspect, but it suggests that artists’ 
right to even call their work art is subject to the prevailing 
opinions and mores of lawmakers.16 Additionally, the 
regulation did not result from any appeal from the defendant, 
H.M. Revenues & Customs. The Commission acted on its own,17 
and contrary to court rulings in two separate European 
Community member states that held that these and similar 
works should be classified as art.18 Lawmakers with no vested 
interest in the litigation passed this objectionable law. The 
implications following from this regulation have riled the art 
world. Far more radical contemporary artworks could face even 
greater difficulty gaining widespread recognition as artworks. 
Adding to the mystery, the Commission did not attempt to make 
clear its overall policy or reasoning behind the regulation. This 
note argues that legislating what does and does not qualify as 
an “artwork” without any objective or specific rubric goes 
against legal precedent and is dangerous to the livelihood of 
artists.19 Implementing a universal standard for the assessment 
of “art” as a formal classification would not be as difficult as it 
might seem: U.S. copyright standards already possess the 
necessary structure,20 and the European recognition of artists’ 
moral rights is mirrored in these standards.21 
This note will begin in Part I with brief overviews of 
Minimalist Art and Conceptual Art, paying particular attention 
to the public reception of⎯and reactions to⎯shifting trends in 
artworks over time and geography. Part II will give a brief 
explanation of the legislative systems at work in the European   
 15 Kennedy, supra note 10. 
 16 Pierre Valentin, European Definition of Art Is Absurd: The Fact that the 
European Commission Can, Without Any Public Consultation or Publicity, Overrule the 
Decision of Two National Tribunals, Makes a Mockery of the Judicial Process, ART 
NEWSPAPER (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/European-definition-
of-art-is-absurd/22178 [hereinafter Valentin, European Definition]. 
 17 Id.; Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. 
 18 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. 
 19 For an in-depth treatment of art and judicial subjectivity through the lens of 
various aesthetic theories, see Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 
(2005). Farley suggests that judges and courts could rely more directly on these various 
aesthetic theories in developing their art-judging jurisprudence. Id. at 808. Aesthetic 
philosophies filter into opinions subconsciously, even sometimes reluctantly, according to 
Farley. Id. at 845. Being more upfront about the use of these theories could clarify courts’ 
rulings, and the “rich discourse” could give courts more support. Id. at 809. 
 20 For a discussion of “recognized stature” under U.S. copyright law, see infra 
notes 262-80 and accompanying text. 
 21 For a discussion of “droit morale” under the Berne Convention, see infra 
notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
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Community (EC),22 as well as an introduction to the European 
value-added tax system. Part III of this note will discuss various 
instances of courts, both in the United States and abroad, 
attempting to navigate the intersection of artwork and customs 
duties and taxation. Part IV will explore various approaches to 
protection for conceptual and visual artworks, giving special 
attention to problems encountered by the more difficult cases. 
That part will conclude with a suggested method for evaluation 
and classification of artworks that can be applied by courts and 
legislators, domestically and abroad, that leaves intact both the 
artists’ intentions and their artworks’ integrity. This note will 
conclude with a brief discussion of how similar VAT or flat-tax 
systems implemented in the United States could lead to 
comparable difficulties in U.S. courts and legislatures. 
I. THE ART BACKDROP 
New art, and particularly conceptual art, has a history 
of challenging the public with works that have not yet been 
received as art. Legislators and customs officials are not 
typically on the cutting edge of the art world, and they can be 
as hostile as the general public to new works by avant-garde 
artists. Flavin’s and Viola’s works, though hardly new 
artforms, represent conceptual methods in art that fit into a 
rich history of progressive upstarts challenging the established 
norms of the art world.23 The criticisms of many late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century works of art—the Damien Hirst 
vitrines,24 the Allan Kaprow “happenings,”25 the Chris Burden 
performance works26—are numerous, but discord between 
newer artists, who experiment in form, material, and content, 
and the canon of art history, is almost a tradition itself. 
  
 22 For purposes of this note, I will be using EC and EU interchangeably—EC 
when referring to cases where the EC is specifically mentioned, and EU when referring 
to the member states. The EC was absorbed into the EU when it was created, but 
current case law and legislation still refers to the EC without caveat. European 
Community—EC, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/european-
community.asp#axzz1rfwQHuWh (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
 23 See WILLIAM FLEMING, ARTS & IDEAS 583 (9th ed. 1995) (describing twentieth 
century modern artists as “command[ing] attention” by “intend[ing] to delight or irritate, 
to arouse or denounce, to exhort or castigate, to surprise or excite, to sooth or shock”). 
 24 See Maev Kennedy, Art Market “a Cultural Obscenity,” GUARDIAN (June 3, 
2004, 6:29 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jun/03/arts.artsnews. 
 25 See Judith Rodenbeck, Madness and Method: Before Theatricality, 13 GREY 
ROOM 54, 59 (2003), available at http://slc.academia.edu/JudithRodenbeck/Papers/ 
402348/Madness_and_Method_Before_Theatricality. 
 26 See Roger Ebert, The Agony of the Body Artist, ROGER EBERT’S J. (Oct. 14, 2009, 
11:08 PM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/ebert/2009/10/the_agony_of_the_body_artist.html. 
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A. Flux Is Constant in the Art World: A Brief History 
Take the seventeenth century turn from the late 
Renaissance’s “bold humanistic thinking” into the “bitter self-
reproach” of the Counter-Reformation.27 This social movement 
brought a return to a strong religious presence in art.28 
Caravaggio and others imbued this baroque-period work with a 
dark humanism that was not always well received.29 The 
religious populace favored a “more conventional elegance and 
illusionism . . . .”30 Even the nineteenth century romantic 
Delacroix’s color-intensive, emotional, and macabre works were 
once the subject of “storms of protest and abuse[,]” though they 
now rest comfortably among other works of the movement.31 
These “rebels” draw attention for the blatant and unapologetic 
ways in which they push the edge of the previous movement 
into the infancy of the next. Manet’s Realist paintings “drew all 
manner of critical vituperation from the press and public.”32 
Academics of the day “held [Raphael] to be the perfect painter” 
even though all agreed the “ugliness” of realism should be put 
aside for a more uplifting style of art.33 Rodin had trouble as 
well, suffering accusations that his sculpture was “[t]oo 
lifelike”—or worse—“[t]oo good.”34 Even when Impressionism 
was first introduced it was “a term of critical derision.”35  
Twentieth century modernists often intended for their 
works to be overt challenges to the form of art de mode, and 
“[j]udging from the reactions to Picasso’s early exhibits [and 
Stieglitz’s famous Armory Show] . . . some artists succeeded 
beyond their wildest expectations.”36 Artists of the early 
twentieth century had to fight hard for acceptance, holding 
“street demonstrations against museums and art galleries that 
refused the modernists recognition.”37 The protests subsided 
halfway through the century, and many of “[t]hese artists [are 
now considered] old masters of modern art.”38 
  
 27 FLEMING, supra note 23, at 377. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 383-85.  
 30 Id. at 385. 
 31 Id. at 516-17.  
 32 Id. at 551. 
 33 Id. at 553. 
 34 Id. at 554. 
 35 Id. at 560. 
 36 Id. at 583, 630. 
 37 Id. at 585. 
 38 Id. at 583, 630. 
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Even the most open modernist mind was challenged by 
the cubists’ and futurists’ abstractions, but the Dadaists’ and 
Surrealists’ reactions to World War I pushed it even further.39 
The Dadaists and Surrealists both advocated abandoning the 
prevailing styles of art.40 The constant state of flux of the early 
twentieth century continued well into the middle of the 
century, and the technological innovations of the greater 
society continued to have a profound effect on the arts.41 Facing 
alienation from a society deeply affected by war, modernists in 
New York developed the abstract expressionist “school,” 
expanding on the breakthroughs of the cubists and futurists.42 
And even these Abstract Expressionists found acceptance 
difficult at first, with “some of the avant-garde commercial 
galleries hesitat[ing] to accept their paintings for exhibition.”43 
The action painting of Jackson Pollock and the color-field 
painting of Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman eventually put 
some of this resistance to rest.44 
When the Minimalists emerged later in the century, the 
hard-fought emotion and humanism was gone from their 
works, traded instead for “‘primary structures’ [and] basic 
geometric volumes . . . .”45 What most distinguished 
minimalism was the increased importance of the works’ 
physical or environmental context—not just hanging on walls 
or atop pedestals, but “rest[ing] on the floor . . . or occupy[ing] a 
whole room.”46 Another shift in focus characteristic of 
minimalism was the presentation of “art items that are 
indistinguishable from the raw material they were made 
from.”47 There is minimal differentiation between the artwork 
and the non-art materials used in its creation.48 Duchamp and 
his “readymades”—vacuum cleaners, bicycle wheels, urinals—
were the inspiration for this shift.49 The problem for 
  
 39 Id. at 605-07. 
 40 Id. at 605-09. 
 41 Id. at 629-30. 
 42 Id. at 632-33. 
 43 Id. at 635. 
 44 Id. at 635-40. 
 45 Id. at 645 (citation omitted). 
 46 Id. at 647. 
 47 Rikki Sapolich, When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral 
Rights Model of Copyright Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 460 (2007) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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minimalists was that viewers would often be puzzled by a lack 
“of the things [they] tend to expect to find within artworks.”50  
B. The Artists, Themselves 
Dan Flavin was an American minimalist who devoted 
the latter part of his career to, and garnered a great deal of 
international attention from, a series of art installations 
crafted primarily from fluorescent lighting fixtures one could 
buy in any hardware store.51 The Museum of Modern Art and 
the Guggenheim and Whitney museums hold a number of 
Flavin’s works in their permanent collections. His work 
occupies an important place in the conceptual-art movement, 
and his installations are generally abstract and untitled except 
for dedications to various people.52 This note concerns a work 
by Flavin entitled Six alternating cool white/warm white 
fluorescent lights vertical and centred (1973).53 Flavin’s 
minimalist style is very context-dependent, because his works 
are generally large enough to fill an entire room.  
Bill Viola is an American conceptual and experimental 
artist whose work has been dedicated primarily to installations 
involving video.54 Viola’s work is also held by museums 
internationally, and he is considered a major figure in 
contemporary art, particularly for his experimental and moving 
work with video. This note concerns a work by Viola entitled 
Hall of Whispers.55 While Flavin and Viola challenge “traditional 
sculpture,”56 they are far from rebels in the worlds of minimalist 
art and video art. 
One of the ironies of this litigation was that the 
materials Flavin and Viola used in their sculptures, while not 
very “traditional,” were hardly the most unusual. For over a 
  
 50 NANCY G. HELLER, WHY A PAINTING IS LIKE A PIZZA: A GUIDE TO 
UNDERSTANDING AND ENJOYING MODERN ART 52 (2002). 
 51 Gemini G.E.L., Dan Flavin, JONIWEYL.COM, http://www.joniweyl.com/Flavin_ 
Bio.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). Dan Flavin was born in Jamaica, New York, in 1933. He 
died in 1996. Id. 
 52 The Collection: Dan Flavin, MOMA.ORG, http://www.moma.org/collection/ 
artist.php?artist_id=1911 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). 
 53 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9; see also Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. 
v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 
[3] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal (London)). 
 54 Artist Biography, BILLVIOLA.COM, http://www.billviola.com/biograph.htm 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Bill Viola was born in 1951. Id.  
 55 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9; see also Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 
2008 WL 5326820, at [2]. 
 56 For purposes of this note, “traditional sculpture” is defined as three-
dimensional forms cast or carved of wood, metal, or clay, often in human form. 
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century artistic rebels have been “expand[ing] the vocabulary 
of visual media . . . . [T]he twentieth century produced a 
succession of artistic innovators, each in turn pushing 
expressive norms to their limits and beyond.”57 Examples of 
other non-art materials used by minimalists and other artists 
are raw wood, Legos, bricks, aluminum, “rope, cigarette butts, 
newsprint, taxidermic animals, latex,”58 crockery,59 bodily 
fluids,60 pieces of candy,61 chewing gum,62 human hair,63 
chocolate,64 soup cans,65 tiger sharks,66 money,67 and post-it 
  
 57 Nathan M. Davis, Note, As Good as New: Conserving Artwork and the 
Destruction of Moral Rights, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 218 (2011). 
 58 Id.; see HELLER, supra note 50, at 101-07; see also Farley, supra note 19, at 822 
n.54 (brick); A Mixture of Frailties, AGNEW’S GALLERY, http://www.agnewsgallery.com/ 
latest-acquisitions/a-mixture-of-frailties/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (latex); Artist 
Database: Alisa Dworsky, ARTMAPBURLINGTON.COM, http://artmapburlington.com/ 
artistdatabase/?portfolio=alisa-dworsky (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (rope); Carolyn 
Classen, Newsprint Artist Nick Georgiou Is Unique, TUCSON CITIZEN (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://tucsoncitizen.com/community/2010/12/06/newsprint-artist-nick-georgiou-is-
unique/ (newsprint); Paul Heidelberg, He Turns Raw Wood into Works of Art, SUN 
SENTINEL (July 10, 1986), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1986-07-10/news/ 
8602100655_1_horse-wood-cypress-warehouse (raw wood); Milwaukee Art Museum 
Acquires Aluminum Slice Chair by Designer Mathias Bengtsson, EASTCITYART.COM, 
http://www.eastcityart.com/2011/05/04/milwaukee-art-museum-acquires-aluminium-
slice-chair-by-designer-mathias-bengtsson/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (aluminum); 
Paula Mitchell Bentley, Upcycled Cigarette Butt Artwork, GREEN UPGRADER, 
http://greenupgrader.com/5572/green-cigarette-butts/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) 
(cigarette butts); Rachel Poliquin, Taxidermy Artists, RAVISHING BEASTS, 
http://www.ravishingbeasts.com/display/ShowJournal?moduleId=10934318&registered
AuthorId=126289&currentPage=2 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (taxidermic animals); 
Nathan Sawaya, THE ART OF THE BRICK, http://www.brickartist.com/ (last visited Mar. 
9, 2012) (Legos).  
 59 Dam Sen Park, Saigon, AMASCBLOG, http://amasc.blogspot.com/2007/12/ 
dam-sen-park-saigon.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 60 See Marina Galperina, 10 Artworks Made with the Artist’s Own Bodily Fluids, 
FLAVORWIRE.COM, http://flavorwire.com/185770/10-artworks-made-with-the-artists-own-
bodily-fluids (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 61 See Félix González-Torres: Portrait of Ross, SHAPE & COLOUR BLOG (June 23, 
2010), http://shapeandcolour.wordpress.com/2010/06/23/felix-gonzalez-torres-portrait-of-
ross/; Stefanie Hessler, One Small Piece of Candy in Félix González-Torres’ Art, SMALL 
WORLDS PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2011), http://smallworldsproject.com/?p=674. 
 62 See Sarah Lyall, Whimsical Works of Art, Found Sticking to the Sidewalk, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/ 
14/world/europe/14muswell.html. 
 63 See “Spooky,” Art Student Creates Hair Raising Necklaces from Human 
Hair, ODDITY CENT. (June 30, 2011), http://www.odditycentral.com/news/art-student-
creates-hair-raising-necklaces-from-human-hair.html. 
 64 See Jean L. Zaun, Chocolate Artistry, WERTZ CANDY, 
http://www.wertzcandy.com/chocolate/about.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 65 See Christopher Knight, Critic’s Notebook: Was Andy Warhol’s “Campbell’s 
Soup Cans” Inspired by Willem de Kooning?, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/10/entertainment/la-ca-knight-notebook-20110710. 
 66 See Davis, supra note 57, at 218; Roberta Smith, Just When You Thought It 
Was Safe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/arts/design/ 
16muse.html. 
 67 See JOHNNY SWING .11, http://johnnyswing.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
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notes.68 These materials appear with increasing regularity on 
the tags next to artworks in major museums.69 These “atypical” 
materials are undeniably a part of “our cultural heritage.”70  
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE VALUE-ADDED TAX SYSTEM 
The fees imposed by U.K. Customs on the Haunch of 
Venison gallery included “value added tax.”71 Value-added tax 
(VAT) is a form of consumption tax which is levied against 
goods and services both “within the territory of [an EC member 
state] . . . [and through] the importation of goods” into a 
member state.72 The Sixth Council Directive implemented the 
present VAT system in 1977.73 This directive “aim[ed] at a 
further harmonization of the various national laws” that 
developed from the first five directives.74 The implementation of 
these first five directives was intended to establish “a common 
market [among the EC member states] . . . whose characteristics 
are similar to those of a domestic market.”75 A “harmonized” 
system of tariffs (TARIC) developed out of these directives, 
which established a “uniform basis for assessment” in a 
“[c]ommon system of value-added tax.”76 Each member state was 
required to adopt a version of the legislation into its individual 
legal system.77 In the U.K., the “common market” system was 
adopted in 1973 after implementation of the Second Directive.78  
  
 68 Gavon Laessig, Awesome Post-It Note Art, BUZZFEED, http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
gavon/post-it-note-art (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  
 69 Davis, supra note 57, at 218.  
 70 Id. 
 71 Valentin & McClean, supra note 6. 
 72 BEN J.M. TERRA & JULIE KAJUS, INTRODUCTION TO VALUE ADDED TAX IN 
THE EC 6 (1991). 
 73 Sixth Council Directive, 77/388/EEC, 1977 O.J. (L 145). This Directive was 
published on June 13, 1977. 
 74 TERRA & KAJUS, supra note 72, at 8. 
 75 Id. at 5. 
 76 Sixth Council Directive, supra note 73, at 1. 
 77 The two primary ways in which the European Commission passes 
legislation are through directives and regulations. EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER 
MAASTRICHT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET 5 
(Ralph H. Folsom et al., eds., 1996) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT]; see also art. 249 (189) of 
the EC Treaty. A directive sets a policy that each member state must then adopt in a 
manner appropriate for its individual system. MAASTRICHT, supra, at 5. The member 
states are not always required to take any action in response to the issuance of a 
directive. Id. “[D]irective[s are] ‘binding as to the result to be achieved’ but ‘leave[] to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods.’” Id. (quoting art. 189 of the Treaty of 
Rome).  
  Regulations differ from directives in that they are immediately binding on all 
member states upon their publication in the Official Journal of the European Community 
(Official Journal or O.J.) and “must be complied with fully by those to whom they are 
addressed.” European Parliament Fact Sheets, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 16, 2000), 
 
1674 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
The Seventh VAT Directive was implemented in 199479 
upon the recognition that, in regards to works of art, the 
different systems of the various member states were causing 
“distortion of competition and deflection of trade . . . .”80 This 
directive established “[s]pecial arrangements applicable 
to . . . works of art.”81 The Seventh Directive added language to 
the previous version that lowered the taxable amount on works 
of art to “a fraction of the amount” of tax applied to all other 
imported goods.82 This directive had the effect of raising the 
import tax on works of art in the U.K. from 2.5 percent to 5 
percent.83 Of course, U.K. art dealers were upset by this increase 
in import costs. They worried that this tax increase would 
“undermine [their] competitiveness with the New York market.”84 
The Commission, however, felt strongly that harmonizing EC 
“artists’ resale rights [would] . . . put an end to various kinds of 
discrimination and inequality . . . which currently exist across 
the Community for visual artists and . . . allow them to achieve 
parity with other categories of creative artists . . . who could 
expect ongoing copyright royalties.”85  
“Works of art” were defined in Article 26a, added in the 
Seventh Directive,86 and this new article fit within the system of 
“combined nomenclature” (CN) instituted by a 1987 amendment 
to the Sixth Directive.87 This new article defined works of art, in 
  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/1_2_1_en.htm (citing art. 5(10) of the EC 
Treaty in ¶ 2(a)). Regulations do not require the individual member states to adopt their 
content through some form of their own legal system. Id. They are in force either upon 
publication of the Official Journal or on a date specifically indicated in the regulation 
itself. The EC regulation passed concerning Flavin’s and Viola’s works was specifically 
noted to take effect twenty days after publication in the O.J. Commission Regulation 731, 
supra note 14, at 2. The “decision” at issue in this note is one of these regulations—
immediately binding on all member states in the European Community and in force 
upon its publication—August 11, 2010. Id. 
 78 Neil Warren, The UK Experience with VAT, 3 REVENUE L.J. 75, 75 (1993). 
 79 Id. The Seventh Directive was published on February 14, 1994 as an 
amendment to the Sixth Directive. Id. For a brief discussion of the Sixth VAT 
Directive, see DAVID W. WILLIAMS, EC TAX LAW 82-83, 852-86 (1998).  
 80 Seventh Council Directive, 94/5/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 60) 16. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. (art. 1(b)). Generally the taxable amount was either the price paid by 
the importer or the open-market value of the goods. See Sixth Council Directive, supra 
note 73, at 7 (art. 11(B)(1)(a-b)). 
 83 Maren Günther, Written Question to the Commission E-0551/98, 1998 O.J. 
(C 223) 93. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Mr. Monti, Answer Given on Behalf of the Commission, 1998 O.J. (C 223) 94. 
 86 Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 17. 
 87 Council Regulation 2658/87/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 256) 1-5. Regulation 2658 
created a system of nomenclature and classification code numbers in accordance with 
previously adopted regulations in order to update and assume the management of the 
TARIC system (a system of integrated tariffs of the European Communities). Council 
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particular sculptures, as “original sculptures and statuary, in 
any material, provided that they are executed entirely by the 
artist.”88 The structure of this system of combined 
nomenclature allowed for expansion of the tariff classifications 
at the member state level and regularized the system.89 This 
1987 regulation also “laid down the general rules . . . [of] 
interpretation” for this harmonized tariff system.90 The 
regulation affecting Flavin and Viola (2010 regulation) was 
adopted as further clarification of the 1987 regulation.91 
Sellers of goods and services in the United States will only 
encounter the VAT when “importing goods [or] services into the 
  
Regulation 2658, supra, at 1-2. “The combined nomenclature shall comprise: (a) the 
harmonized system nomenclature; (b) Community subdivisions to that nomenclature, 
referred to as ‘CN subheadings’ in those cases where a corresponding rate of duty is 
specified; and (c) preliminary provisions, additional section or chapter notes and 
footnotes relating to CN subheadings.” Id. at 2 (art. 1(2)).  
  Each CN was assigned an eight-digit code, the first six of which indicate 
the heading and subheading of the harmonized system nomenclature, with the last two 
indicating the CN subheading if one is present. Id. art. 3; see also Integrated Tariff of 
the European Communities (TARIC), 1993 O.J. (C 143) 8; Commission Regulation 
2793/86/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 202) (setting out the numeric codes to be used in the unified 
system). Absent a subheading the last two digits would be “00.” Council Regulation 
2658, supra, art. 3(1)(b). Additional digits would be added onto this code for purposes of 
member state statistical subdivisions and any additional community subdivisions. Id. 
art. 3(2)-(4). 
  The 2010 regulation affirmed the original customs classifications of the 
Flavin and Viola artworks under Chapters 94 and 85, respectively. Commission 
Regulation 731, supra note 11, at 2. Chapter 94 covers “miscellaneous manufactured 
articles,” which includes lamps and lighting fixtures. Council Regulation 2658, supra, 
at Annex Sec. XX; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS 
UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang= 
en&Taric=9405&Area=US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#9405000000 (last 
modified Mar. 19, 2012).  
  Chapter 85 covers, among other things, “television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers.” Council Regulation 2658, supra, at Annex Sec. XVI; see also 
TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&Taric=85219000&Area=
US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#8521900000 (last modified Mar. 19, 2012).  
 88 Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 24 (Annex 1(a)). The standard 
classification for works of art in the TARIC system followed the language of the Seventh 
Directive. These definitions were placed within Chapter 97 under Section XXI of TARIC 
entitled “Works of Art, Collectors’ Pieces and Antiques.” Council Regulation 2658, supra 
note 87, at Annex Sec. XXI; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS 
UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/measures.jsp?Lang=en&SimDate= 
20110923&Area=US&Taric=9703000000&LangDescr=en (last modified Mar. 19, 2012). 
Under this chapter, heading 9703 is the CN code for “[o]riginal sculptures and statuary, in 
any material.” Id. Neither the Seventh Directive nor TARIC goes any further in describing 
what might qualify as sculpture under this harmonized system heading. Id. 
 89 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at 1. 
 90 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2.  
 91 Id. The Flavin/Viola amendments were not the only ones made by the 
Commission at that time. See Commission Regulation 732, 2010 O.J. (L 214) 4 (EU). 
Many other amendments have been made over time.  
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EU [member states]” from the United States.92 This import tax is 
generally paid by the buyer of the goods or services, and does not 
apply to goods with only a de minimis value.93 The tax is 
“chargeable at the time when [the] goods enter the [member 
state].”94 The standard VAT rate among EU member states ranges 
from 15 to 25 percent.95  
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ART AND THE LAW 
When courts approach the problem of classification of 
artworks for tax and import duty purposes, deference is 
generally correctly given to the vicissitudes of the art world.96 
Courts, both in the United States and abroad, have customarily 
declined to act as arbiters of taste.97 What may not have been 
considered “art” ten, twenty, or fifty years ago might now be 
recognized as valuable by experts and the art world. There is a 
continued risk, as evidenced by the 2010 regulation, that 
vanguard contemporary artworks may still be denied their 
status as art. Neither the U.S. judiciary nor courts and 
legislative bodies abroad should permit this unfortunate and 
shortsighted result. Part III explores the U.K. approach to this 
problem, both in the context of the Flavin/Viola matter and 
through earlier EU jurisprudence. As to the domestic approach, 
the United States has had fewer occasions to address this 
question, though one case in particular concerned the 
importation of an abstract sculpture that was initially charged 
  
 92 Tax Advisors Planning System, Title 43, 43:13:01(E) Imports Into the EU 
(RIA 2011) (referencing Sixth EC VAT Directive, art. 70). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Sixth VAT Directive: Uniform Basis of Assessment, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/ 
legislation_summaries/other/l31006_en.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2007); Sixth 
Directive, supra note 73, at 7 (tit. VII, art. 10, sec. 3). 
 95 Tax Advisors Planning System, Title 43, 43:13:01(C) Value Added Tax 
(VAT) Rates (RIA 2011). As of Directive No. 77/388, the minimum tax must be at least 15 
percent in each member state. Sixth VAT Directive, supra note 94. The minimum rate 
was increased as of January 1, 2011. This caused much consternation among those 
affected by the undiscounted VAT rate on imports, as the minimum then increased to 20 
percent. See Accounting for VAT When the Standard Rate of VAT Returned to 17.5 Per 
Cent, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/rate-
changes.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); Increase in the Standard Rate of VAT to 20 Per 
Cent, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/rate-
increase.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).  
 96 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903); 
Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428, 430-31 (Cust. Ct. 1928); Haunch of 
Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] UKVAT (Customs) C-
00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal (London)).  
 97 See, e.g., Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251; Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 
WL 5326820 at [50]-[51]. 
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import tax on the basis of its component material.98 The U.S. 
court, just as the U.K. Tribunal did with Flavin and Viola, 
found the work product to indeed be art.99 There are still other 
methods by which courts and legislatures can approach this 
issue, and those are suggested and discussed in Part IV. 
A. Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. H.M. Revenue & 
Customs 
The heart of this inquiry is the dispute over customs 
bills charged to London’s Haunch of Venison gallery when it 
imported the contemporary sculptures of Dan Flavin and Bill 
Viola. Both works were imported in a disassembled state and 
subject to a tariff rate normally charged to goods and component 
parts intended for further sale or assembly.100 In other words, 
the customs officials assessed the light tubes and video 
equipment as light tubes and video equipment, not as 
disassembled artworks packed in boxes. Ironically, they assessed 
the tariff on the estimated value of the assembled pieces—in 
their final form as artworks.101 Thus the customs officials 
acknowledged the imports were valuable as artwork, but 
simultaneously denied them the reduced tariff rate.102  
1. 2006–2008: Trouble with U.K. Customs 
The Haunch of Venison gallery appealed the customs 
bill because Flavin’s and Viola’s sculptures were not assessed 
under the discounted rate normally reserved for works of art.103 
When the artworks were first imported, customs officials 
declared that the works were subject to the full VAT (then 17.5 
percent).104 The gallery brought a lawsuit against HM Revenue 
& Customs (HMRC) protesting this classification before the 
London VAT and Duties Tribunal in 2008.105 The gallery sought 
relief from the tariff assessment by arguing that the artworks—
even in their disassembled state—qualified for the discounted rate 
  
 98 See Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428-29; see also infra Part III.B. 
 99 See Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 431; see also infra Part III.B.  
 100 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820 at [18]. 
 101 Irina Tarsis, Of Art and Tax: The EU Commission on Customs Code Redefines 
Art for Tax Purposes, CARDOZO JURIST (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cardozojurist.com/2011/ 
02/of-art-and-tax-the-eu-commission-on-customs-code-redefines-art-for-tax-purposes/; 
Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. 
 102 See sources cited supra note 101.  
 103 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820 at [18]. 
 104 Tarsis, supra note 101. 
 105 See generally Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820.  
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reserved for artworks.106 The trial lasted four days, during which 
the Tribunal visited the Tate galleries to view similar Flavin and 
Viola works.107 The Tribunal also heard testimony from “[s]everal 
high profile witnesses” as to the correctness of the customs 
officials’ classifications.108 HMRC’s central concern was that 
treating imported goods that do not appear to be traditional 
artworks as art would open the door to “any 
importer . . . declar[ing] any goods to be works of art and thereby 
circumvent[ing] the positive rates of duty.”109 HMRC argued that 
the particular components in this case should be considered not 
as unassembled artworks but instead according to their 
“objective characteristics,”110 namely as light bulbs and DVD 
players.111 HMRC also argued that sculptures could not be only 
two dimensional.112 This related particularly to the Viola works,  
projection[s] emanating from the screen which is itself a flat object 
and [about which HMRC contended] . . . it is simply incorrect as a 
matter of fact to consider the mechanism by which that image is 
realized as being part of a sculpture even if that mechanism does 
have a three dimensional form.113  
The Tribunal dismissed both of these concerns. These 
pieces qualified as sculpture by virtue of “all the components 
[having been chosen] deliberately and as part of the artistic 
process with a view to achieving [the] artistic intention with 
the greatest effect.”114 The Tribunal did not expressly require 
engagement with the third dimension. It found instead that 
these components included the structure by which the 
projectors and screens would be hung, the materials and 
equipment selected for the projectors and screens, and the 
specific spatial arrangement of these elements for the actual 
installation.115 The combination of these elements satisfied the 
Tribunal’s definition of sculpture.116 
  
 106 Id. at [4]. 
 107 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd., 2008 WL 5326820, at [39]. 
 110 Id. at [36], [40] (citing Case C-35/93, Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West, 1994 E.C.R. I-2655). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at [35]. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at [48]. 
 115 Id. at [49]-[51]. 
 116 Id. 
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The Tribunal also dismissed HMRC’s more central 
concern⎯“that importers might declare just anything as works 
of art” to evade duty rates.117 The Tribunal declared it 
absurd to classify any of these works[, in their unassembled form,] as 
components ignoring the fact that the components together make a 
work of art. . . . It stretches the objective characteristics principle too 
far to say that a work of art is no longer a work of art if it is 
dismantled for transportation . . . .118  
The Tribunal also noted that “where there is doubt about a 
classification . . . , preference should be given to one of the 
Chapter 97 headings over those of any other Chapter.”119 Having 
negated both of HMRC’s main arguments, the Tribunal concluded 
that these works should be classified as sculptures and are 
thereby subject to the lesser VAT rate.120 Appeals were allowed by 
the Tribunal, but as of this writing HMRC has not appealed.  
The Tribunal relied upon Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH & 
Co. v. Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-West, which addressed tariff 
classifications for articles imported in an unassembled or 
disassembled state.121 The parts at issue in Eisbein GmbH were 
photocopier parts and accessories.122 The classifications, 
although made by German customs officials, ultimately utilized 
the same EU harmonized tariff system that the U.K. customs 
officials applied to Flavin and Viola.123 Imports of fully-
assembled apparatuses into Germany owe an additional 
antidumping duty, and this duty was imposed in Eisbein 
GmbH.124 The importer appealed, arguing that the parts were 
not fully-assembled photocopiers and thus not subject to the 
duty.125 The importer relied on the Explanatory Notes to the 
antidumping rule, which included simply-assembled articles 
(i.e., apparatuses) in the “fully assembled” category.126 These 
  
 117 Id. at [50]. 
 118 Id. at [49]-[51]. 
 119 Id. at [44] (discussing Case 155/84, Onnasch v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-
Packhof, 1987 E.C.R. 1449). For a discussion of the various classification “Chapters,” 
see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; see also infra note 149. 
 120 Id. at [51]. Such a classification would also exempt the works from a 
separate customs duty of 3.7 percent, which was charged to the gallery. Valentin, 
European Definition, supra note 16. 
 121 Case C-35/93, Develop Dr Eisbein GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-
West, 1994 E.C.R. I-2655, at [3]. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. at [1]. 
 124 Id. at [4] (discussing the antidumping duty under Regulation 2640/86/EEC, 
1986 O.J. (L 239) 5).  
 125 Id. at [6]. 
 126 Id. 
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were described as “articles the components of which are to be 
assembled” using only simple instructions.127 The importer 
argued that the components of a photocopier require highly 
specialized staff for assembly, and that therefore assembly 
cannot be accomplished with simple instructions.128 Thus, the 
photocopiers were neither “unassembled” requiring simple 
assembly nor “fully assembled,” the antidumping rule did not 
apply, and the parts should be treated solely as components.129 
Customs officials argued that the requirement of highly 
specialized staff did not take these articles out of the “simple 
assembly” category.130 They argued that this only occurs when 
“changes to . . . the part in question [would be required] in the 
course of the production process.”131  
The court disagreed with the importer, asserting instead 
that “highly qualified specialized staff” does not mean the 
assembly was not “simple,”132 and further, that neither “the 
assembly technique [nor] the complexity of the assembly method” 
should be taken into account when classifying components for 
customs purposes.133 The court defined simple assembly in the 
negative: “parts [that] have to undergo major processing before 
assembly . . . [do] not have the relevant essential character” of 
the final product.134 The inverse of that argument is that parts 
that do not have to undergo major processing do “have the 
relevant essential character of the final product.”135  
Flavin’s and Viola’s installation components may have 
technical and specific assembly instructions, but they do not 
require major processing before assembly, as raw materials 
might. Thus, these component light bulbs, projectors, and 
screens can be understood to possess the “relevant essential 
character” necessary for classification under Eisbein GmbH as 
their final forms—sculptures and works of art. This distinction 
implies that, unless changes to the forms of Flavin’s and Viola’s 
installation components needed to take place, they should be 
classified as the full apparatus when imported. The rule in 
Eisbein GmbH makes this even plainer: “[F]or tariff purposes an 
article presented unassembled or disassembled must be 
  
 127 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. at [6]-[7]. 
 130 Id. at [8]. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at [17]-[23]. 
 133 Id. at [19]. 
 134 Id. at [12]. 
 135 Id. 
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regarded as a complete article. No reference is made to the 
assembly technique which must be applied in order to produce 
the finished product.”136 Simple assembly or major processing 
requirements aside, if disassembled products “must be regarded 
as a complete article,”137 it is clear that the Tribunal relied on 
the holding in Eisbein GmbH in making its decision regarding 
Flavin’s and Viola’s works. 
2. 2008–Today: The Reaction of the European Commission 
Within weeks of the Tribunal decision, “the issue [of the 
Flavin and Viola imports] was on the agenda of the EC Customs 
Code Committee . . . .”138 The committee knew that two member 
states (the U.K. and Holland) “had held that video installations 
should be classified as sculptures[,]” while other member states 
“expressed the view that components of video installations 
should be taxed individually (e.g. as video projectors).”139 Within 
one year, and “without apparent further consideration or 
consultation, the committee decided that a draft regulation 
[would] be prepared for a future meeting—[one that would] 
overturn the UK and Dutch National Court decisions.”140  
This proposal was before the Customs Code Committee 
by June 2010;141 acting under the 1987 regulation it “was 
adopted at the [August] meeting and supported by the UK.”142 
The new regulation’s sole concern was the classification of 
these specific artworks by Flavin and Viola. Although the 1987 
regulation allows for changes to be made to the harmonized 
system that relate to “changes in requirements relating to 
statistics or commercial policy,”143 there are no claims or 
references made in the text of the 2010 regulation to any such 
changes in “statistics or commercial policy”144 driving this 
amendment. As a regulation, this change to the tariff 
classification system CN was effective immediately upon its 
  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. This was discovered through a Freedom of 
Information request made by Pierre Valentin, the attorney representing the gallery in 
the 2008 Tribunal matter. Id.  
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id.; Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2. 
 143 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at 4 (art. 9(b)). 
 144 Id. 
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publication in the Official Journal, which made it binding on all 
member states.145  
The artworks at the center of the 2010 regulation were 
described objectively, without any reference to the artists’ 
names or the names of the works.146 Under the heading 
“Description of the goods,” Bill Viola’s video work was listed as:  
A video-sound installation consisting essentially of the following 
components: 
-- 10 video reproducing apparatus of the digital versatile disc (DVD) 
type, 
-- 10 projectors using matrix liquid crystal display (LCD) technology, 
of a kind also capable of displaying digital information generated by 
an automatic data-processing machine, 
-- 10 single self-powered loudspeakers, mounted in their enclosures, 
and 
-- 20 digital versatile discs (DVDs) containing recorded works of 
“modern art” in the form of images accompanied by sound. 
The appearance of the video reproducing apparatus, the projectors 
and the loudspeakers has been modified by an artist with a view to 
appear as a work of “modern art” without altering their function.147 
Dan Flavin’s sculpture was described as: 
A so-called “light installation” consisting of six circular fluorescent 
lighting tubes and six lighting fittings of plastics. 
It has been designed by an artist and operates in accordance with 
instructions provided by the artist. It is intended to be displayed in a 
gallery, fixed to the wall. 
The fittings are separate from each other and are intended to be 
mounted vertically. 
The tubes are to be placed into the fittings, providing two 
alternating shades of white.148 
Each of these two descriptions was assigned a 
classification code: Viola’s work was assigned to TARIC Chapter 
85 (Electrical Machinery and Equipment) and Flavin’s to   
 145 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 2. The regulation actually 
provided that the regulation was “to enter into force on the 20th day following its 
publication in the Official Journal.” Id. (art. 3) (emphasis omitted). With the date of 
publication at August 14, 2010, the regulation would be effective as of September 3, 2010. 
 146 Nevertheless, those familiar with the matter would have no trouble 
making out to what the EC was referring. Id. at 3. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
2012] TAXING AVANT-GARDE ART 1683 
Chapter 94 (Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles).149 The 
reasons given for the classifications range from the presumptive 
to the “absurd.”150 For Flavin’s work, the Commission claimed 
that “[c]lassification under [Chapter 97] as a sculpture is 
excluded, as it is not the installation that constitutes a ‘work of 
art’ but the result of the operations (the light effect) carried out 
by it.”151 The Commission asserted that Viola’s “video-sound 
installation is neither composite goods, as it rather consists of 
individual components, nor goods put up in sets for retail 
sale . . . . Consequently, the components of [both] installation[s] 
are to be classified separately.”152 The thrust of the Commission’s 
reasoning can be found in the following section of the regulation: 
Classification under [Chapter 97] as a sculpture is excluded, as none of 
the individual components or the whole installation, when assembled, 
can be considered as a sculpture. The components have been slightly 
modified by the artists, but these modifications do not alter their 
preliminary function of goods of Section XVI. It is the content recorded 
on the DVD which, together with the components of the installation, 
provides for the “modern art.”153 
The concern here is whether these works are classifiable 
as “sculpture.” Chapter 97 of TARIC only specifies that a 
sculpture be of “any material.”154 Nothing in that chapter 
attempts to define or give features to any of the categories of 
art mentioned (sculpture is not the only category).155 The 
Tribunal judges in 2008 had no trouble recognizing these works 
  
 149 Chapter 85 under Section XVI of TARIC is entitled “Electrical Machinery 
and Equipment and Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image 
and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles.” 
Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at Annex Sec. XVI; see also TARIC Consultation, 
EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/ 
taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en&Taric=85219000&Area=US&Expand=true&Sim
Date=20110923#8521900000 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). Viola’s work was classified 
under codes 8521 90 00, 8528 69 10, 8518 21 00, and 8523 40 51. 
  Chapter 94 under Section XX of TARIC is entitled “Furniture; Bedding, 
Mattresses, Mattress Supports, Cushions and Similar Stuffed Furnishings; Lamps and 
Lighting Fittings, Not Elsewhere Specified or Included; Illuminated Signs, Illuminated 
Nameplates and the Like; Prefabricated Buildings.” Council Regulation 2658, supra note 
87, at Annex Sec. XX; see also TARIC Consultation, EUR. COMM’N: TAX’N & CUSTOMS 
UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds2/taric/taric_consultation.jsp?Lang=en& 
Taric=9405&Area=US&Expand=true&SimDate=20110923#9405000000 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2012). Flavin’s work was classified under code 9405 10 28. 
 150 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] 
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820, at [49] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties 
Tribunal (London)). 
 151 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. (emphasis added). 
 154 Council Regulation 2658, supra note 87, at Annex sec. XXI. 
 155 Id. 
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in their assembled states as sculptures and artworks.156 The 
Tribunal also found it a “stretch” to refuse to recognize the 
components as the equivalent of their finished, assembled 
form.157 The dictionary defines sculpture as “the product of the 
sculptor’s art,”158 as well as “a three dimensional work of art.”159 
While neither definition clarifies the matter, the judicial 
system has traditionally relied on the art maker and the art 
community to affirm a work as art.160 The members of the 
Commission, however, applied some other analysis to this same 
question, though the regulation does not make clear the 
principles they based their decision upon.161  
The Commission’s reasoning disregards the U.K. VAT 
Tribunal’s 2008 decision. Since the component parts of Flavin’s 
and Viola’s installations are both presented disassembled, the 
Commission holds, they must be classified by their individual 
components.162 But the Commission also declares that, even 
assembled, these works are not art.163 The Commission believes 
displaying the images contained on the Viola DVDs is the final 
step necessary for his work to become sculpture.164 It reasons 
similarly with Flavin’s work, claiming that the addition of a 
“light effect” to the arrangement of light tubes creates the 
art.165 The Commission distinguishes between “art effects” and 
assembled, non-art components, which it finds necessary but 
not sufficient to constitute a finished work. If this distinction 
holds, the “art effect” of, for example, Flavin’s work could never 
be conveyed: it is a “light effect,” something that could not be 
shipped or taxed because it is not a material. Even more 
troubling, the Commission does not follow its own rule when it 
assesses the nondiscounted VAT rate for the supposed non-art 
components; it assesses VAT on the value of the finished 
artwork, which is much higher than the value of industrial 
  
 156 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] 
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820, at [47]-[49] (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties 
Tribunal (London)). 
 157 Id. at [51]. 
 158 Sculpture Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sculpture (last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
 159 Sculpture Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sculpture?q=sculpture (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 160 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text. 
 161 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3. 
 162 Id. at 3. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
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light bulbs and DVD players combined.166 The Commission is 
willing to use the value of the art works as a basis for the tax, 
but it refuses to grant the components of unassembled works 
the discounted status granted to art.167  
Non-art components are necessary components of 
certain artworks. “Art effects” require their non-art 
components, and the Commission acknowledges this critical 
interplay, though only nominally.168 These artists expressly 
desired the “light effect” and the DVD images to be produced 
with these screens and light tubes arranged in a certain way, 
and the Commission also acknowledges this intention.169 And 
while true that these works rely on certain non-material, non-
art components, under the Commission’s standard, it is 
impossible to import any kind of artwork that employs 
electricity in its final form under the discounted VAT rate for 
artworks. This standard is too high. If a court accepted the 
Commission’s standard, any work that uses infrastructure 
upon its completion—pressurized water for a fountain, 
electrical plugs for a neon sculpture, wind for chimes—may not 
be classified as art, but rather a composition of non-art 
components. A work would only become art in its intended 
context or ultimate form—when the play button is pressed or 
the electrical current is live. This is akin to legislating that 
artworks that are intended for a particular context are “not 
art” until they are actually placed in that context. Under this 
standard, a fully assembled Flavin work would cease to be an 
artwork once the gallery closed for the night and the janitor 
turned off the lights.170 This standard thus requires that an 
artwork be continually connected to every element of its 
context in order to remain art.171  
  
 166 Valentin, Not Art, supra note 9. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Pierre Valentin asked a similar question in a series of opinion pieces 
published by The Art Newspaper. See, e.g., Valentin, European Definition, supra note 
16. 
 171 Interestingly, Duchamp’s Fountain was never intended to be connected to 
a plumbing source. His intention was to keep it freestanding and unconnected to any 
piece of infrastructure, but for its platform. William Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s 
Fountain: Its History and Aesthetics in the Context of 1917, in MARCEL DUCHAMP: 
ARTIST OF THE CENTURY 78 (Rudolf E. Kuenzli and Francis M. Naumann, eds., 4th 
prtg. 1996). Under the Commission’s ruling, there would be no “art effects” of 
Duchamp’s piece because it is free of infrastructure and context; thus it would not be 
ruled as a protected sculptural artwork. 
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More significantly, this standard separates the artist’s 
work product from the art itself. The Commission asserts that 
the art is found when the artist’s work product is added to a 
particular infrastructure or context, but of course that final 
element is generally outside of the artist’s control. Creating the 
art is not the accomplishment of the gallery owner who turns on 
the lights! The problem is that this standard creates no account 
in the law for what “art” is at all. Recall the definition of 
sculpture under the TARIC classification—“original sculptures 
and statuary, in any material, provided that they are executed 
entirely by the artist . . . .”172 The Commission’s standard, which 
places the work done by the context and infrastructure ahead of 
the work done by the artist, is clearly operating outside of the 
harmonized system.  
B. U.S. Analogues in Customs Duties  
The United States does not have a consumption tax or 
VAT system, but there are customs duties imposed on 
imports.173 By statute, art works are exempt from these 
customs duties.174 Courts will occasionally need to determine if 
an import is a work of art in order to decide upon the proper 
customs duty.175 There are a handful of cases in the United 
States that address relevant import duties, but they were 
decided under an earlier iteration of the customs code. This 
historical precedent is still instructive, however, when 
evaluating the recent Commission regulation.  
One of the most famous of these cases involved a simple 
sculpture cast from bronze that the customs officials had trouble 
classifying as a “sculpture.”176 Interestingly, this rather 
“sensational lawsuit . . . captured the attention of American 
public opinion for two years.”177 This 1928 U.S. Customs Court 
decision concerning Constantin Brancusi’s Bird in Space 
sculpture is the U.S. case that most closely parallels the Flavin 
and Viola matter in both the facts and the court’s reasoning.178   
 172 Seventh Council Directive, supra note 80, at 24 (Annex 1(a)) (emphasis added).  
 173 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (briefly discussing the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States). 
 174 Farley, supra note 19, at 822 (citing Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590, 684 (1930), 
19 U.S.C. § 1201, P1807 (1958), amended by Pub. L. No. 86-262, 73 Stat. 549 (1959)). 
 175 Id. 
 176 See Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928). 
 177 André Paleologue, Afterword to BRANCUSI VS. UNITED STATES: THE 
HISTORIC TRIAL, 1928, at 118 (English-language ed., Adam Biro 1999). 
 178 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428. In the case, the sculpture is referred to as 
Bird in Flight. Id.  
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Brancusi’s sculpture was subject to an import duty upon its 
entry into the United States because the sculpture did not 
exactly resemble a “bird.”179 In the United States at the time, 
sculptures were exempt from import duties as “zero-rated works 
of art.”180 Customs, refusing to classify the sculpture as such, 
subjected the “bird” to a 40 percent import duty, the rate 
generally applied to manufactures of metal.181 Photographer 
Edward Steichen had purchased the sculpture; he paid the duty 
and then went to court to protest the determination.182 The court 
eventually agreed with Steichen, and his $240 was returned.183  
The Customs Court acknowledged that under the Tariff 
Act of 1922 artworks were entitled to duty-free entry, as 
opposed to “manufacture[s] of metal” which would be subject to 
a tariff of “40 per cent ad valorem.”184 The court wrote into its 
opinion the entire list of materials and processes included 
under the Tariff Act’s “art and sculpture” heading.185 While the 
Tariff Act does not make this list explicitly exclusive, all of the 
“traditional” materials of sculpture are included, and the statute 
did not indicate that any “non-traditional” artwork or materials 
should be read into the list.186 Even while the court conceded 
that “the exercise of rather a vivid imagination” is required to 
see the Brancusi sculpture as even resembling a bird,187 it held 
that the sculpture, crafted from traditional materials, warranted 
the discounted duty under the Tariff Act.188  
  
 179 Id. at 429. 
 180 Kennedy, supra note 14. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Margit Rowell, Preface to BRANCUSI VS. UNITED STATES, supra note 177, at 
9. The Guardian lists this amount as $600. Kennedy, supra note 10. 
 184 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 428. “Ad valorem” taxes are taxes “based on the 
assessed value of [the] real estate or personal property” at issue. Ad Valorem Tax, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/advaloremtax.asp#axzz1rCwgDuPW 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012). A familiar example of an ad valorem tax is municipal property tax. 
 185 Id. at 428-29. Paragraph 1704 of the Tariff Act of 1922 specified that 
“sculpture” was to be understood as: 
professional productions of sculptors only, whether in round or in relief, in 
bronze, marble, stone, terra cotta, ivory, wood, or metal, or whether cut, 
carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from the solid block or mass of marble, 
stone, or alabaster, or from metal, or cast in bronze or other metal or 
substance, or from wax or plaster, made as the professional productions of 
sculptors only . . . . 
Id. at 428. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 429. 
 188 Id. at 431. 
1688 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
The court applied a three-part test: (1) was this the work 
of a professional, (2) was this an original work, and (3) was this 
an article of utility?189 Despite contradictory testimony, the 
court answered the first two questions affirmatively: “There is 
no question in the mind of the court but that the man who 
produced the [sculpture] is a professional sculptor, . . . [and w]e 
also find it is an original production.”190 The court would need 
to answer the third question in the negative for the work to 
qualify as an artwork under the Act.191 Interestingly, the court 
addressed this question somewhat inversely. Instead of saying 
whether this piece was an article of utility, the court set out to 
determine whether it was a “work of art.”192 The court 
acknowledged a strong precedent that would suggest this work 
be denied this categorization.193  
Nevertheless, the court favored a more contemporary 
approach.194 In recognizing the “so-called new school of art” the 
court accepted an art movement “whose exponents attempt to 
portray abstract ideas rather than to imitate natural objects.”195 
While the majority stated that it did not have to agree or be “in 
sympathy with these newer ideas[,]” the court held that it must 
recognize the change.196 The court stated that “the fact of [the 
new art movements’] existence and their influence upon the art 
world as recognized by the courts must be considered.”197 The 
Brancusi object was “beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and 
while some difficulty might be encountered in associating it 
with a bird, it is nevertheless pleasing to look at and highly 
ornamental . . . .”198 Thus, the court recognized the metal 
production as a sculpture and a piece of art, and granted it free 
entry under the Tariff Act.199 The court relied on the principle of 
“objective acceptance,” which subordinates conflicting subjective 
responses of the court to expert testimonials. This principle 
recognizes the shifting trends of the art world, and should have 
been employed by the Commission when assessing Flavin’s and 
Viola’s works, though this rubric likely needs additional structure. 
  
 189 Id. at 430. 
 190 Id. at 429. 
 191 Id. at 428 (citing Paragraph 1704 of the Tariff Act of 1922). 
 192 Id. at 430. 
 193 Id. The court even discussed briefly the reasoning and holding in United States 
v. Olivotti, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916). See infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text. 
 194 Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. at 430. 
 195 Id. at 430-31. 
 196 Id. at 431. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
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At the very least, the Commission should have explained why it did 
not analyze the works under this “objective acceptance” principle. 
In Part IV of this note, other rubrics will be discussed that offer 
more structure but still maintain this objective character.200 
Two other U.S. Customs Court cases (one that predated 
Brancusi and another that followed four decades after) 
addressed questions that relate to the parts versus wholes, 
components versus finished products issues. In one case, the 
intention to use the pieces of the work as a unit determined the 
imports being considered a whole.201 In the other, a marble 
“sculpture,” which was only decorative and failed to rise to the 
level of fine art, was found not to be an artwork by the court.202 
In Miniature Fashions, Inc. v. United States, importers 
appealed a decision classifying patterned cotton shirts and 
shorts imported from Japan as separates.203 This classification 
subjected the clothing to a rate of 25 percent ad valorem under 
the Tariff Act of 1930.204 Plaintiffs in the suit contended that 
the sets⎯designed, manufactured, and sold together as 
“cabana sets”⎯were instead “entireties for tariff purposes.”205 
They argued that these “entireties” should be assessed under 
the “Other” category under the same section of the Tariff Act, 
which covered articles of clothing manufactured “wholly or in 
part . . . of cotton, and not specially provided for [elsewhere in 
the Act].”206 Articles falling under this “Other” category were 
only subject to a rate of 20 percent ad valorem.207 Witnesses for 
the plaintiffs testified that the sets were “inexpensive . . . [and] 
have very little . . . value when separated.”208 The Customs Court 
found the articles to be separates because the shirts and shorts 
would remain functionally the same even upon separation: 
“[A]lthough these cabana sets were designed . . . for sale 
together, . . . the functions of the several parts of the set were no 
different from what they would otherwise have been had the sets 
not been so coordinated. . . . [T]he shirt continued to be a shirt 
and the shorts remained shorts.”209  
  
 200 See infra Part IV. 
 201 Miniature Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 55 Cust. Ct. 154 (1965).  
 202 United States v. Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46 (1916). 
 203 Miniature Fashions, 55 Cust. Ct. at 155. 
 204 Id.  
 205 Id. (emphasis added). 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 156. 
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The importers’ appeal focused on proving that trends in 
fashion, with an emphasis on dual-purpose apparel 
manufacturing, were determinative of whether these pieces were 
“entireties” and not separates.210 The court admitted “that [while] 
a changing popular attitude played a role in the conclusions 
reached in [cases like Brancusi v. United States], we do not 
believe that [those] decisions actually rested upon this factor.”211 
The court declared that “a designer’s conception of ‘fashion’ or ‘eye 
appeal’” is not sufficient to overcome previous policy of the court: 
If what is imported as a unit is actually . . . two or more individual 
entities which, even though imported joined or assembled together, 
nevertheless, retain their individual identities and are not 
subordinated to the identity of the combination, duties will be imposed 
upon the individual entities in the combination as though they had 
been imported separately. Conversely, if there are imported in one 
importation separate entities, which by their nature are obviously 
intended to be used as a unit, or to be joined together by mere assembly, 
and in such use or joining the individual identities of the separate 
entities are subordinated to the identity of the combined entity, duty 
will be imposed upon the entity they represent.212 
Therefore, the question of subordinated identity was the 
determining factor for the Customs Court, and applying that 
concept to Flavin and Viola is instructive. The Commission 
argues that the imposed VAT rate should apply to the 
functional components of Flavin’s and Viola’s works. But, the 
Commission also concedes that the works take on a separate, 
unified identity when assembled and “used as a unit[,]”213 in the 
words of the Miniature Fashions court.214 This qualified 
concession as to the “unified identity” of the Flavin and Viola 
works is inconsistent with the Commission’s claim that the value 
on which tax should be calculated is the value of the unit as an 
artwork rather than the value of the individual components.215  
Closer to the realm of sculpture, the question of whether 
carved marble objects were dutiable as “manufactures of 
marble” valued on their component material or as works of art 
arose in United States v. Olivotti.216 Valued on their component 
material, the marble boxes and plinths at issue would have 
  
 210 Id. at 157. 
 211 Id. at 158. 
 212 Id. at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting Donalds Ltd. v. United States, 32 
Cust. Ct. 310 (1954)). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Commission Regulation 731, supra note 14, at 3. 
 215 See Tarsis, supra note 101. 
 216 United States v. Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46, 47 (1916). 
2012] TAXING AVANT-GARDE ART 1691 
been subject to a 45 percent ad valorem duty the Tariff Act of 
1913; but, if classified as works of art under a different 
paragraph the applicable duty rate would have been 15 percent 
ad valorem.217 The government appealed the decision of the 
Board of General Appraisers, which found the marble works to 
fall within the 15 percent rate as works of art.218 The board had 
reasoned that since Greek temples were art by virtue of simply 
being sculpture, these pieces must be art as well.219 The Court 
of Customs Appeals was not as easily satisfied, reasoning that 
one of the pieces being “the work of a sculptor[,] . . . . fashioned 
from solid marble[,]” and “artistic and beautiful” was insufficient 
“to constitute a sculpture.”220 The court in Olivotti was ultimately 
unwilling to expand the reach of Paragraph 376 to include the 
decorative and undeniably sculptural, even beautiful, qualities of 
the marble pieces in question, holding that neither the marble 
font nor the marble seats were sculptures or works of fine art 
dutiable at the lower rate.221 “That everything artistic and 
beautiful can not [sic] be classed as fine art was well established 
in [a Supreme Court decision],” which held that concededly 
beautiful paintings on glass windows “were representative of the 
decorative and industrial rather than of the fine arts.”222  
In Olivotti, the court addressed decorative elements 
that, when added to functional objects (or precious stone), did 
not rise to the level of artworks. This is distinguishable from 
Flavin’s and Viola’s use of nondecorative components that 
themselves comprise an artwork. Olivotti holds that the 
decorative elements of a finished commercial product may not 
elevate it to the classification of “sculpture” or “artwork.” But, 
the European Commission correctly understands that Flavin’s 
light tubes and Viola’s DVD players were not decorative 
elements of the installations. Haunch of Venison did not argue 
that decorative elements made these sculptures art; instead, the 
gallery argued it was the artists’ intentions, along with their 
  
 217 Id; see also Paragraphs 98 (“Manufactures of marble, etc.”) and 376 
(“Paintings, drawings, etc.”) of the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 123, 151 (1913), ch. 
16, paras. 98, 376. 
 218 Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 47. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 48. At this time the court was still hewing closely to the conception of 
sculpture being mainly representative of “natural objects, chiefly the human form.” Id. 
Twelve years later in Brancusi, the court recognized this traditional understanding but 
gently put it to the side in light of the changing tides of contemporary art. See supra 
notes 176-98 and accompanying text. 
 221 Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 49. 
 222 Id. (citing United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 74 (1892)). 
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reception by the art world, that made the works art.223 Thus 
Olivotti is not on point in this matter. In any event, Brancusi 
removes any lingering doubts that even basic materials can be 
deserving of tax discounts offered to works of art by virtue of 
their artistic manipulation by artists into artworks.224  
IV. CRITIQUES AND SUGGESTIONS 
The “tension between the law and the evolution of ideas 
in modern or avant garde art”225 can lead to the protectionist 
tendencies seen in the U.K. customs officials’ worries about 
retail imports classified under false pretenses. The law is 
insistent upon “taxonomiz[ing and classifying] artistic 
creations,” while the avant-garde is making valiant efforts to 
be “whatever [one] can get away with.”226 On a fundamental 
level, this tension might always exist because “law is about 
precedent whereas art is about the evolution of ideas.”227 The 
law cannot be expected to accommodate such a broad (and 
shifting) definition of art,228 but, significantly, “[a]rt is not apart 
from the law.”229 Often with conceptual art, “extrinsic 
circumstances” and context must be taken into account to 
properly classify the works.230 If a work is accepted within the 
context of the “art world,” that is sometimes the full extent to 
which it is validated as art.231 The law’s inherent structure is at 
odds particularly with a school of art that requires a certain 
amount of context in its presentation. The troubles foreseen by 
U.K. customs officials—an open door for importers to call any 
shipped product “art”—is rooted here. For some of the more 
conceptual artworks, testimony as to their legitimacy will grow 
in necessity and importance. The alleged or potential burden of 
such a requirement, however, is not a justification for blanket 
legislation that makes even legitimate imports impossible.  
  
 223 Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, [2008] 
UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties Tribunal 
(London)). 
 224 See Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928). 
 225 Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 213 (2010) (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 
C 07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Farley, supra note 19, at 807. 
 228 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213. 
 229 Farley, supra note 19, at 808. 
 230 Cronin, supra note 225, at 236. 
 231 See generally Arthur C. Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 571 (1964); see 
also Farley, supra note 19, at 844 (discussing Danto and “institutionalism”). 
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The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), adopted by 
Congress in 1990 to broaden general copyright protections to 
include artists producing physical “work[s] of visual art,”232 
attempts to resolve some of the art versus law dispute by 
establishing criteria which obviate subjective classification. 
While VARA is not without criticism, it makes inroads to 
recognizing the “moral rights” of artists in a way that the 
United States has not previously done. VARA gives credence to 
both the claims of the artists themselves (in declaring a visual 
work “art”) and the claims of the art world and its specialists 
(in recognizing or lauding a visual work as “art”).233 The foreign 
nations that are signatories to the Berne Convention accept a 
similar convention in the “droit morale” protections offered to 
artists in those jurisdictions. The copyright protections under 
VARA—echoes of droit morale—bridge art and law, and may 
offer an effective legal rubric for the assessment of art for tax 
and other purposes. The Tribunal that heard the 2008 Haunch 
of Venison lawsuit has already employed this standard: it took 
testimony from experts in the art world and made sure to 
ascertain that Flavin and Viola were indeed bona fide artists—
that they had “recognized stature.”234 This part will further 
discuss these and other possible “bridges” between art and law. 
A. Problems for Conceptual Art 
Contemporary, conceptual art has a difficult status in 
society and in the law. Part of the problem is that “the ‘plain 
and ordinary’ meanings of words describing modern art”235 
cannot keep pace with the developments within these art styles 
and types. The law has equal difficulty determining how to 
treat these types of developing works. As discussed below, 
VARA offers protection of certain artists’ rights for works of a 
“recognized stature.”236 Some scholars read this to mean that 
VARA only protects “the most revered work of the Old 
Masters.”237 Yet others see the low bar on creativity in the 
  
 232 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006); see also Cronin, supra note 225, at 209. 
 233 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
 234 See Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs Comm’rs, 
[2008] UKVAT (Customs) C-00266, 2008 WL 5326820 (Dec. 11, 2008 VAT & Duties 
Tribunal (London)). 
 235 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213 (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 
07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008)). 
 236 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). See infra Part IV.B. 
 237 Cronin, supra note 225, at 213 (citing Kelley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791, 
at *11).  
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copyright standards as allowing for artwork with only a 
minimal level of original, authored expression to garner 
copyright protections.238  
Charles Cronin, in a 2009 article concerning VARA and 
conceptual artworks made with living materials, asserts that in 
order to classify these conceptual works as art, “extrinsic 
circumstances [are relied upon] to a much greater extent 
than . . . works in traditional genres.”239 He argues that the 
nature of conceptual works requires a contextual approach: the 
works cannot be interpreted without these extrinsic 
circumstances. A Monet would easily be recognized, even if 
“stripped of its sumptuous frame[,]” but Jeff Koons’s balloon 
figures or Duchamp’s urinal would be seen as having little or 
no aesthetic appeal if they were encountered outside of their 
“frame” or “art” context.240 For Cronin, the reliance on extrinsic 
circumstances and context means this avant-garde art garners 
less protection from VARA. Cronin’s argument is limited, 
however, because these more conceptual works are 
intentionally moving away from the traditional confines of 
gallery walls and museum spaces.241 In fact, “[c]ertain current 
art practice is about breaking down the doors of art’s exalted 
cloister and exploding the definition of art, especially 
definitions that envision a narrow ‘high’ art.”242 This artistic 
practice should be protected even if it presents a challenge to 
the current copyright scheme. 
Cronin also argues that conceptual works garner less 
copyright protection because they are primarily concepts or ideas. 
It is universally understood that ideas are not copyrightable, yet 
this overlooks the material components of these works. Artists 
over the last century have been stretching the form of artworks 
but have not ceased creative expression through their chosen 
medium. Conceptual and contemporary artists have utilized 
customarily functional materials to access artistic expression that 
the more removed and rarified “traditional” art materials 
sometimes cannot. Conceptual artists present finished works that 
  
 238 See infra notes 254-53 and the accompanying text. 
 239 Cronin, supra note 225, at 236. 
 240 Id. at 235-36. What Cronin considers a demerit toward the classification of 
the artwork Arthur Danto argues is a baseline required for the interpretation of art 
objects. Danto and other “institutionalists” would not distinguish between Monet and 
Duchamp; for them, all art objects require the context of the “art world” in order to be 
seen as art. See generally Danto, supra note 231; see also Farley, supra note 19, at 844. 
 241 For a discussion of intentional changes in and departures from the art-
world ethos, see supra Part I.A. 
 242 Farley, supra note 19, at 814. 
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are products of creative expression, but Cronin argues that artists 
should not be allowed to “elevate[] the status of these [non-art] 
materials to that of art by addressing them as such . . . .”243 Cronin 
asserts that works employing materials that have not been in use 
“[s]ince time immemorial” do not rise to the level of art just 
because an artist has done something creative with them.244 
However, this assertion is simply untenable. Nowhere in the 
copyright-protection statutes exists such a requirement that art 
materials satisfy some preapproved list of acceptable and 
traditional materials. Cronin offers two pointed criticisms of 
avant-garde art, both of which focus on contextual and material 
components, but he leaves out artistic intention and how the art 
world receives the work. These conceptual works should not fail to 
garner protection simply because they are focused on the idea, 
and not the materials employed in their execution.  
B. Moral Rights, Foreign and Domestic 
International copyright protections were established in 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (Berne Convention). This doctrine is particularly focused 
on the “[r]ights of [a]ttribution and [i]ntegrity.”245 Berne 
Convention rights “are commonly called ‘moral rights’ because 
they ‘are a constellation of rights that ensure an ongoing 
relationship between the author and the creative work outside 
[of] economic issues.’”246 For instance, the right of integrity 
“allow[s] an artist to prevent changes to her work that would 
affect her honor or reputation negatively.”247 This right, granted 
to artists, serves to protect their finished work product from 
  
 243 Cronin, supra note 225, at 252. 
 244 Id. at 243. 
 245 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006); 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 23:16 (2011); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 
6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), 1160 U.N.T.S. 30. The United 
States adheres to the Berne Convention with certain important exceptions, namely 
that the U.S. Berne Implementation Act of 1988 insists that “the Copyright Act, the 
Lanham Act, and state law” are the “sole source of rights” for copyright protection in 
the United States, rejecting the additional “moral rights” under Article 6bis of the 
Berne Convention. 7 PATRY, supra, § 23:23. “The obligations of the United States under 
the Berne Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law.” 
Id. § 23:45 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-568, 100th Cong., 26 Sess. § 2(2), 102 Stat. 2853). 
This is not to say that certain moral rights have not been extended in the Copyright 
Act to works of visual art over time (e.g., VARA), but rather that the United States’s 
recognition of artists’ moral rights came well after the international community’s. Id. 
§ 23:23. 
 246 Davis, supra note 57, at 219-20 (quoting Justin Hughes, American Moral 
Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 660 (2007)). 
 247 Id. at 220 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 6). 
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being changed into something else (e.g., a collection of non-art 
components). Though a layperson might try to destroy an 
artist’s work by denigrating or taxing it, this kind of clumsy 
effort might indeed enhance the prestige of the artist. Still, the 
honor of artists as artists lives through their works; the act of 
denying that their work is art may play well in the press, but it 
indeed negatively affects their honor. 
European copyright laws appear “better adapted to 
address the interests of fine artists because they protect not 
only the finished work, but also the artist’s control over the 
creative process and ultimately her persona and reputation.”248 
It is ironic, then, that EU copyright better respects the persona 
and reputation of the artist while the EU VAT system, which 
recognizes both the existence and cultural importance of fine 
artwork, does not. These two systems should ideally be working 
in concert; interpretations under one (i.e., TARIC) should 
respect and heed the protections of the other (i.e., the Berne 
Convention). In passing the 2010 regulation, the Commission 
seems to be doing anything but that. Considering the 
increasing use of “atypical” materials in contemporary 
artworks, the implications of the 2010 regulation become all 
the more alarming. The next time a customs official in the U.K. 
is confronted with a box of bricks or cords of wood imported by 
a gallery or museum and listed as an artwork, it is very likely 
that they will be subject to the import VAT appropriate for 
their raw industrial components.249 The problem of appropriate 
taxation will continue to arise as the frequency of inclusion of 
non-art materials continues to increase in paintings, 
sculptures, and other types of artworks. 
In the United States, VARA extended certain copyright 
protections to “author[s] of work[s] of visual art.”250 Some of the 
rights granted through VARA were “[r]ights of attribution and 
integrity.”251 These rights match the Berne Convention system, 
but standard U.S. copyright requirements must first be met 
before the VARA rights are even reached.252 The basic tenets of 
copyright protection under the Copyright Act require that a 
work be an original, authored expression in a fixed and   
 248 Sapolich, supra note 47, at 455. 
 249 For a discussion of the increasingly common use of nontraditional 
materials in artworks, see supra notes 58-69. 
 250 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006).  
 251 Id. 
 252 Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 
S. Ct. 380 (2011). The court in Kelley called these basic copyright requirements 
“foundational.” Id.  
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tangible form.253 In U.S. copyright law, “the ‘requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice.’”254 Courts find “creativity is not a high bar to 
copyright[, and] . . . a ‘work of art’ exists when ‘by the most 
generous standard [it] may arguably be said to evince 
creativity.’”255 This implies that moral rights of conceptual 
artists could be given all the more protection: if only a modicum 
of creativity is required, many alleged artworks will be 
accepted as such, and many alleged artists will have their 
moral rights protected. 
Though Flavin’s and Viola’s sculptures are only 
“minimally differentiated from [their] non-art materials,”256 
these artists have contributed more than a little creativity in 
detailing how to construct the installations. So long as this 
minimal level is met, it would seem U.S. copyright protection 
could be asserted. How is it, then, that the U.S. copyright 
provisions can be seen as more assertive of an artist’s moral 
rights than the European system and its droit morale 
protections? This demonstrates that something is amiss in the 
2010 regulation.  
A copyright can be obtained with a “low standard of 
originality.”257 This “is intended to minimize the possibility that 
judges would interject their own ideas of what is and is not 
art.”258 Setting the creativity bar low keeps judges from having to 
make subjective determinations, thus “ensur[ing] that judges 
remain objective and neutral.”259 Unpopular or controversial art 
movements could be at risk if judges needed to make subjective 
determinations as to whether a work warrants copyright 
protection. Certain trends in “artistic development might be 
stultified by ignorant or outdated legal evaluations.”260 “Judges 
[could not] make artistic decisions while remaining objective,” 
since the heart of artistic decisions is individual taste, an 
inherently subjective concept.261 The U.S. copyright system 
properly considers a work worthy of protection even if it only 
  
 253 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 254 Sapolich, supra note 47, at 461 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). 
 255 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(1) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006)). 
 256 Id. at 460. 
 257 Id. at 472. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Farley, supra note 19, at 814. 
 261 Sapolich, supra note 47, at 473 (quoting Farley, supra note 19, at 812-13). 
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evinces creativity. That the Commission, operating within a 
system granting greater protections for artists’ moral rights, 
does not acknowledge this creativity as a contributing factor for 
being considered “art” further demonstrates the mysteriousness 
of the Commission’s standard. 
C. VARA’s “Recognized Stature” Protection 
Section 106A(a)(3) of VARA has particular relevance for 
Flavin and Viola. This section provides authors of works of 
visual art the rights: 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion . . . or . . . modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and 
any intentional distortion . . . or modification of that work is a violation 
of that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized 
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right.262  
Destruction is defined as “the state or fact of being 
destroyed” or “the action or process of destroying something.”263 
Destroy means “to put out of existence” or “neutralize.”264 
Admittedly these definitions are narrow in that they bring to 
mind tangible, visceral destruction. In the context of more 
conceptual and experiential work, what is destruction?265 
Perhaps it is simply seeing only the components and not the 
whole. When a party—not the artist—acts to remove or collapse 
or disassemble an artwork, provided it fulfills the other 
requirements under VARA, that party can become liable for 
destruction under the statute. When the discussion centers on 
minimal or conceptual works of art, the question of destruction 
is often tricky. Damien Hirst’s “trash installation” following an 
opening-night party is a near-perfect example.266 The morning 
after the opening, the gallery cleaning crew threw away bags 
containing spent wine cups and cigarette butts, thinking them 
  
 262 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006). 
 263 Destruction Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/destruction (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).  
 264 Destroy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/destroy (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 265 VARA briefly discusses what destruction or modification is not, holding 
conservation and relocation efforts acceptable “modifications” of an artwork that do not 
actually destroy it. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1)-(2). For conceptual artworks, this does not go 
far enough. In dismissing something as small as an idea, a conceptual work may in fact 
be destroyed. 
 266 Daniel Rozenberg (“Dadara”), Trash Worth $100 Million, ART AS MONEY 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://blog.artasmoney.com/art-as-money/trash-worth-100-million/. 
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nothing more than garbage.267 But, Hirst had arranged the 
“trash” after the party, considering it a part of the installation.268 
Although Hirst found it humorous, in terms of VARA protection 
it is possible that the cleaning crew, or even the gallery, would 
have been liable for the installation’s “destruction.”269  
In the context of artwork preservation, these definitions 
also chafe against the realities of some contemporary works of 
art. Certain works “must be disassembled in order to preserve 
their value and ensure their continued existence.”270 Certainly 
Flavin’s and Viola’s installations must be “destroyed” (i.e., 
disassembled) in order to move them from museum to gallery 
or vice versa. In fact, “disassembly is [often] required to 
conserve the work consistently with the artist’s vision.”271 
Nathan Davis’s article challenged a Southern District Judge’s 
decision for hewing too closely to the dictionary definitions of 
“remove” or “destroy” in the context of artwork preservation.272 
Davis asserts, “There is a difference between dismantling the 
sculpture never to recompose it, and dismantling a sculpture 
intending to put it back together once a part of it has been 
fixed.”273 This distinction applies directly to the Flavin and 
Viola installations. Both the Flavin and Viola works were 
dismantled with the intention that the London gallery which 
was importing them would put them back together. When the 
works arrived at U.K. customs, this should have been obvious. 
Had the European Commission understood this distinction, it 
is possible that the classification of these installations as 
“sculpture,” by the U.K. Tribunal would have gone 
undisturbed. Sadly, the Commission did recognize that the 
Flavin and Viola components were intended to be reassembled, 
but they nevertheless denied these installations “sculpture” 
status.274 Instead, the Commission required the act of switching 
the lights and projectors on in order to achieve a finished 
artwork.275 As discussed in Part III, this standard is impossibly 
  
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Davis, supra note 57, at 241. 
 271 Id. (discussing a Robert Morris minimalist sculpture entitled Rope Piece 
consisting of a piece of “rope draped between two painted wooden elements”). Id. at 240. 
 272 Id. at 241 (discussing Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of 
New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226, 2005 WL 1153752 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005)). That decision 
seems predicated on the idea that the work is destroyed once disassembled, thereby being 
unable to “return to existence.” Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See supra Part III.A. 
 275 See supra Part III.A. 
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high, and the distinction the Commission forces on these works 
is not really one of assembled versus disassembled, but one of 
on versus off. Conservationists of any other type of artwork 
would hardly make such a distinction as “whether the 
electricity is flowing.” 
The “moral rights” secured through VARA “protect[] the 
right of an artist to preserve a work of art even after that work 
is sold.”276 It is VARA’s requirement of “recognized stature” that 
gives an artist’s moral-rights claim any legitimacy277: “where a 
particular work of art has achieved recognized stature, VARA 
gives the artist the right to prevent its destruction.”278 The two-
part test for prevailing on these VARA-violation claims 
requires the plaintiff to prove (i) that the piece is a “work of 
recognized stature,” and (ii) that the “[d]efendants destroyed the 
piece in an intentional or grossly negligent manner.”279 
Recognized stature “is generally established through expert 
testimony” that proves that the “artistic merit” of the piece has 
“been recognized by . . . the artistic community and/or the 
general public.”280 For VARA protection, the artist’s particular 
piece at issue must “have achieved such stature[,]” though there 
are circumstances imaginable in which an artist “is of such 
recognized stature that any work by that artist would be subject 
to VARA’s protection.”281 Nathan Davis reads the statute and 
concludes it is “[a]n imperfect solution to the problem”282 because 
it leaves out too many conceptual artists, honoring only the “Old 
Masters.”283 Though not perfect, accepting recognized stature of 
the artist as proof that the artist’s finished products are “art” is 
certainly more defensible than the Commission’s treatment of 
Flavin and Viola. 
  
 276 Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Pollara v. 
Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 277 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006); see also Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 278 Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. 
Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and vacated on other grounds, 
71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 279 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B); Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325); see also 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing Carter’s test 
interpreting VARA). 
 280 Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 281 Id. In the instance of the Hirst party trash being thrown away, Hirst’s 
recognized stature would likely impute onto any work he claims to have authored. 
 282 Davis, supra note 57, at 221. 
 283 Id. at 228. 
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D. “Self-Expression” and Arbiters of Taste 
Besides recognized stature, U.S. courts have required 
self-expression when granting protections to an artwork under 
the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that “[a]ny artist’s original [artwork] holds potential to ‘affect 
public attitudes,’ by spurring thoughtful reflection in and 
discussion among its viewers. So long as it is an artist’s self-
expression, [an artwork] will be protected under the First 
Amendment, because it expresses the artist’s perspective.”284 
This “self-expression” need not be singular or narrow. The 
Supreme Court has said that “a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection . . . .”285 
Requiring such a message, the Court reasoned, would invalidate 
entire wings of major museums that show artists like Jackson 
Pollock.286 Rather, self-expression can be broadly construed. The 
Court has also “distinguished between restrictions on expression 
based on subject matter and restrictions based on viewpoint, 
indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious.”287 A 
“bedrock principle” of First Amendment jurisprudence “is that the 
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”288 
When legislation’s “suppression of speech . . . attempt[s] to give 
one side of a debatable public question an advantage[,] . . . the 
First Amendment is plainly offended.”289  
The Second Circuit takes a similar view of legislation that 
“looks upon visual art as mere ‘merchandise’ lacking in 
communicative concepts or ideas.”290 In Bery v. City of New York, 
the court addressed an appeal concerning regulations the City of 
New York had adopted prohibiting sales of art in public places 
without a general vendor’s license.291 The court found the 
approach of the city “myopic[,] . . . [and] fundamentally   
 284 White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)) (discussing the right 
of an itinerant painter to be granted the necessary permits to sell his work in a 
restricted park). 
 285 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995) (discussing constitutional protections due to a gay and lesbian group 
seeking to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade). 
 286 Id. 
 287 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
 288 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 289 Id. at 430-31 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
785-86 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 290 Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 291 Id. at 691. 
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misperceiv[ing] the essence of visual communication and artistic 
expression.”292 “Visual art[,]” the court held, “is as wide ranging in 
its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book . . . or 
other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”293  
Not so surprisingly, these courts have not required the 
aesthetic opinions of the judges themselves. Judges have been 
hesitant to take steps that would “destroy” an artwork (though 
they are also practicing some self-protection). The majority in 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, a Seventh Circuit case, began, 
“We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to 
be to decide this case.”294 The concurrence expressed a similar 
sentiment: “Like my colleagues, I am not an art critic. So I 
begin with the well-worn adage that one man’s junk is another 
man’s treasure. No doubt [the artist] treasured what the city’s 
bulldozers treated as junk.”295  
These judges, and many others, rely on Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s famous statement on the intersection of 
aesthetics and judicial restraint.296 In Bleistein v. Donaldson, one 
of Holmes’s first Supreme Court opinions, he said that “[it] 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
[artworks] . . . . [S]ome works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation.”297 Holmes’s opinion understood that many art 
movements are “repulsive until the public [learns] the new 
language in which [the artist] spoke.”298 Judges fear exposing 
themselves as “culturally elite” by revealing their aesthetic 
  
 292 Id. at 695. 
 293 Id. Ten years later, in Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, the Second 
Circuit declined to extend the “Bery injunction” to plaintiffs who were selling articles of 
clothing painted with graffiti. 435 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2006). The court reasoned that 
articles of clothing painted with graffiti were not necessarily expressive, and that the 
Bery injunction should be narrowly read not to include “clothing painted with graffiti” 
under the category of “paintings.” Id. Additionally, objects that are utilitarian in nature 
or are promotional/advertising materials do not fall within the protections of VARA. 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 327, 329 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
 294 Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999). In 
Martin, the court discussed the city’s argument that the artist had waived this VARA 
protection through their contract. Id. at 614. Ultimately, the court was not persuaded 
by the city’s argument. Id. 
 295 Id. at 615 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 296 Farley, supra note 19, at 815. 
 297 Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 
(1903)). 
 298 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
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opinions in court—and no judge wants their opinion to be 
vulnerable to later attack.299  
In Martin there was a contract between the artist and the 
city, which had included the possibility of future removal of his 
sculpture from its original site.300 In fact, the sculpture was 
created with this specific possibility in mind, “engineered . . . so 
that it could be disassembled for removal and later 
reassembled.”301 Nowhere in the Martin opinion did the court 
indicate that the artwork, or the VARA protections afforded to it, 
suddenly ceased to exist upon any potential disassembly for 
relocation. Once afforded the recognized stature, the VARA 
protections for Martin’s sculpture could not be easily undone; 
taking the piece apart for relocation would not have 
compromised those protections; neither would have, for 
example, moving the piece on a flatbed travelling down the 
highway. The legal protections would not disappear simply 
because the artwork was disassembled for removal. Clearly 
they would not cease to exist during shipment, either. Such an 
implication would be—to recall the language of the U.K. VAT 
Tribunal—absurd. It would mean that an artwork’s VARA 
protections could be circumvented if the artwork was first 
disassembled. Somehow the components could be destroyed 
without violating VARA but the assembled work could not. 
Such machinations would be the equivalent of removing a 
work’s copyright protections simply by disassembling it. The 
courts’ VARA interpretations provide that an artist’s legal 
protections extend to the disassembled components of an 
artwork because the artwork retains its status as an artwork 
even when disassembled. The European Commission’s 
declaration that Flavin’s and Viola’s works in disassembled 
form (and even once re-assembled) are void of artistic content is 
in direct contradiction to this learned jurisprudence. 
While both the U.S. and EU legal systems accommodate 
the artist’s moral rights—either through droit morale, VARA 
and copyright protections, or the First Amendment concept of 
self-expression—what underpins them all is an acceptance that 
once a work is recognized by the art community as art, 
copyright and other protections should be afforded to it. 
Conceptual works of art may find trouble in language and 
definition, but having satisfied the baseline original and 
  
 299 Farley, supra note 19, at 814-15. 
 300 Martin, 192 F.3d at 611. 
 301 Id. 
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creative expression requirements under the U.S. copyright 
system, these works should at a minimum not be denied 
protections under the law. The question of what qualifies as 
destruction under VARA, while important to investigations of 
liability under the Act, is secondary to the first requirement 
under VARA—the recognized stature provision. It is this 
standard that courts, both domestic and foreign, are primed to 
apply, and many have already proven their ability to do so. 
Legislators can easily get behind this standard because it 
removes any subjectivity they might need (or want) to employ 
in their lawmaking. Lawmakers should decline to act as 
arbiters of taste, just as many learned judges have done, and 
leave instead the expert determinations of an artwork’s status 
to the art experts. 
CONCLUSION 
While some of the pitfalls of VARA have been discussed 
above,302 the standards set out in the legislation—the 
requirements of “recognized stature” in particular—would 
make courts’ evaluations of the merits of an object, installation, 
or experience as an artwork more reliable. This same structure 
could also be applied to the imposition of import taxes and 
duties, particularly in jurisdictions that provide for lower tax 
rates on artwork. The means for applying taxes on the basis of 
an object’s status as “artwork” would be well served by the 
requirements imposed under this recognized-stature condition.  
While the United States does not currently impose a tax 
system similar to the harmonized system of the European 
Community, leading economists have proposed a “consumption 
tax” as an answer to the nation’s economic woes.303 Though the 
idea “offends many conservatives”304 for its enabling of an 
expanded spending power of the government and an increase in 
government overall,305 liberals find it equally unfavorable for 
imposing taxes on citizens’ consumption. It is possible that the 
VAT “appeal to liberals can be enhanced . . . by exempting items 
  
 302 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text. 
 303 Robert J. Barro, Op-Ed, How to Really Save the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
2011, at SR8 [hereinafter Barro, Save the Economy], available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/09/11/opinion/sunday/how-to-really-save-the-economy.html. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Robert J. Barro, Opinion, How to Get That AAA Rating Back, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/files/11_0808_AAA_ 
WSJ.pdf [hereinafter Barro, AAA Rating]; Barro, Save the Economy, supra note 303. 
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such as food and housing.”306 Economists claim that implementing 
this type of tax on consumer spending could raise “revenue 
[of] . . . roughly five percent of G.D.P.”307 In fact, some 
economists see a VAT as “more efficient than an income tax.”308 
But, regardless of one’s opinion, implementing such a system 
would leave the nation vulnerable to a host of classification 
questions. Of course, the classification of artworks for taxation 
purposes is not the main concern of a government seeking to 
dig itself out of a sluggish economy, but allowing further 
sacrifice of the value of our cultural works would have its own 
deleterious effects on the nation. 
For Flavin’s and Viola’s works, the matter is not yet 
closed, even though the European Commission went “to such 
elaborate lengths to overturn the decision of [the Tribunal] in 
relation to a relatively small amount of import tax in relation 
to artworks[.]”309 There is hope: David Zwirner gallery, which 
brought a seldom-seen Flavin series to the International 
Contemporary Art Fair (FIAC)310 in October 2011, and which 
represents the Flavin estate, has recently retained the law firm 
of Mayer Brown to “explore the gallery’s legal options 
regarding the . . . ruling.”311  
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